# v0.3.0 # { "Depends": "py-genlayer:5jycge4q8k23462jtb0b9fyey1s9qz928sz2nbrd9mg4sxqg2qng" } # MacroStance: Autonomous Macroeconomic Policy Oracle & DeFi Risk Controller. # # Ingests a macroeconomic release (FOMC rate decision + CPI YoY) from THREE # independently-hosted, governor-registered feeds, resolves a 2-of-3 quorum # into a discrete monetary stance (DOVISH / NEUTRAL / HAWKISH) through a # validator-checked non-deterministic block, and -- after a 24 hour activation # timelock that any bonded challenger can break with proof of retraction -- # rebinds an integrated lending vault's risk parameters to the stance's fixed # table. Risk parameters are bound to the discrete tier, never to raw numbers. # # Invariants (each is pinned by the suites under tests/): # 1. Callers never pass URLs. URLs are registry state; hosts (and their # registrable domains) are unique across ACTIVE and STAGED slots; feed # rotation is behind a 7 day timelock. # 2. Stance is pure integer math with fixed rule priority; the BPS table is # indexed by stance only. # 3. Quorum verdicts are exactly {0 REJECTED, 1 VERIFIED, 2 QUORUM_FAILURE}; # an outage that could still complete 2-of-3 never costs the reporter. # 4. VERIFIED stances are staged 24h before activation; a retraction at any # time before execution (through the 7-day validity window) cancels the # transition and pays the reporter's bond to the challenger. Feed # documents carry a `release_ts`; nothing at or below the live release's # timestamp can be staged or executed, so a stale mirror cannot roll a # revised stance back. Epochs cannot name a quarter that has not begun. The step-change guard is the combination of: one pending # transition at a time, epochs monotonic by quarter (a stale quarter can # never roll parameters back), execution only after the full timelock, # and parameters drawn only from the fixed per-tier table. # 5. The vault is a ledger-denominated risk simulator: collateral is real # native GEN in custody, debt is notional units (no tokens are lent). # Interest accrues through a RAY-scaled global index, always rounding in # the protocol's favour, so there is no dust and no rounding exploit. import hashlib import json from dataclasses import dataclass from datetime import datetime, timezone from urllib.parse import urlsplit import genlayer as gl from genlayer import Address, u256 from genlayer.storage import TreeMap # genvm-lint matches the bare name `allow_storage` on storage dataclasses. allow_storage = gl.storage.allow # --- Error classification --------------------------------------------------- ERR_UNAUTHORIZED = "ERR_UNAUTHORIZED" ERR_BOND = "ERR_INSUFFICIENT_BOND" ERR_EPOCH_ID = "ERR_INVALID_EPOCH_ID" ERR_EPOCH_STATE = "ERR_INVALID_EPOCH_STATE" ERR_STALE = "ERR_STALE_EPOCH" ERR_PENDING = "ERR_TRANSITION_PENDING" ERR_TIMELOCK = "ERR_TIMELOCK_ACTIVE" ERR_WINDOW = "ERR_CHALLENGE_WINDOW_CLOSED" ERR_FEED_URL = "ERR_UNSAFE_FEED_URL" ERR_FEED_HOST = "ERR_DUPLICATE_FEED_HOST" ERR_SLOT = "ERR_INVALID_SLOT" ERR_NO_STAGED = "ERR_NO_STAGED_FEED" ERR_AMOUNT = "ERR_INVALID_AMOUNT" ERR_LTV = "ERR_LTV_EXCEEDED" ERR_COLLATERAL = "ERR_INSUFFICIENT_COLLATERAL" ERR_NO_DEBT = "ERR_NO_DEBT" ERR_NO_BALANCE = "ERR_NO_CLAIMABLE_BALANCE" ERR_TRANSFER = "ERR_TRANSFER_FAILED_RESTORED" ERR_PAYLOAD = "ERR_FORGED_PAYLOAD" ERR_STANCE = "ERR_INVALID_STANCE" ERR_STALE_RELEASE = "ERR_STALE_RELEASE" ERR_STALE_REVISION = "ERR_STALE_REVISION_ROLLBACK" ERR_FUTURE_EPOCH = "ERR_FUTURE_EPOCH" ERR_FUTURE_RELEASE = "ERR_FUTURE_RELEASE" # --- Stance tiers and their bound risk tables (basis points) ------------------ DOVISH = 0 NEUTRAL = 1 HAWKISH = 2 STANCE_NAMES = ("DOVISH", "NEUTRAL", "HAWKISH") # stance -> (max_ltv_bps, borrow_rate_bps, reserve_factor_bps) RISK_TABLE = ( (8000, 350, 1000), (7500, 550, 1500), (6500, 900, 2500), ) # Stance rule thresholds (basis points). Integer math only, no floats. HIKE_BPS = 25 CUT_BPS = 25 CPI_HAWKISH_ABOVE_BPS = 300 CPI_DOVISH_BELOW_BPS = 200 # Sanity bounds for a feed's numeric fields; outside them the document is a # schema error (treated as an OUTAGE of that source, never as a confirmation). RATE_MIN_BPS = -2000 RATE_MAX_BPS = 2000 CPI_MIN_BPS = -1000 CPI_MAX_BPS = 10000 # --- Quorum verdicts --------------------------------------------------------- REJECTED_RELEASE = 0 VERIFIED_STANCE = 1 QUORUM_FAILURE = 2 VERDICT_NAMES = ("REJECTED_RELEASE", "VERIFIED_STANCE", "QUORUM_FAILURE") # Per-source classification inside one quorum round. SRC_CONFIRMED = "CONFIRMED" SRC_RETRACTED = "RETRACTED" SRC_NOT_FOUND = "NOT_FOUND" SRC_OUTAGE = "OUTAGE" SOURCE_KINDS = (SRC_CONFIRMED, SRC_RETRACTED, SRC_NOT_FOUND, SRC_OUTAGE) MAX_FEED_BODY = 4096 # --- Epoch lifecycle --------------------------------------------------------- EP_STAGED = "STAGED" EP_EXECUTED = "EXECUTED" EP_CANCELLED = "CANCELLED" EP_REJECTED = "REJECTED" EP_QUORUM_FAILED = "QUORUM_FAILED" EP_EXPIRED = "EXPIRED" # States from which an epoch may be (re-)proposed. EXECUTED and STAGED are # terminal / in-flight; the rest are retryable. RETRYABLE = (EP_CANCELLED, EP_REJECTED, EP_QUORUM_FAILED, EP_EXPIRED) # --- Economics (wei; 1 GEN == 10 ** 18) --------------------------------------- ATTO = 10**18 REPORTER_BOND = ATTO // 10 # 0.1 GEN minimum MAX_BOND = 10 * ATTO CHALLENGER_BOND = ATTO // 10 KEEPER_REWARD = ATTO // 100 # paid from the locked reserve to the reporter of an executed release, never from escrow # --- Time -------------------------------------------------------------------- ACTIVATION_TIMELOCK = 24 * 3600 # A staged transition must be executed inside [activates_at, activates_at + # PROPOSAL_VALIDITY_WINDOW]. Past it the release is too old to apply blindly: # the call expires it, releases the bond and leaves the stance untouched. PROPOSAL_VALIDITY_WINDOW = 7 * 24 * 3600 # Release timestamps (unix seconds) carried by feed documents. The static # bounds are checked identically by every validator; the contract additionally # refuses a timestamp more than a day ahead of the block clock, because the # executed release timestamp becomes a high-water mark and a far-future value # would lock out every later release. RELEASE_TS_MIN = 946684800 # 2000-01-01 RELEASE_TS_MAX = 4102444800 # 2100-01-01 RELEASE_FUTURE_SLACK = 24 * 3600 FEED_ROTATION_TIMELOCK = 7 * 24 * 3600 SECONDS_PER_YEAR = 365 * 24 * 3600 # --- Vault math -------------------------------------------------------------- BPS = 10000 RAY = 10**27 # --- Feed registry ----------------------------------------------------------- SLOT_COUNT = 3 SLOT_LABELS = ( "A: FOMC / Monetary Release Mirror", "B: FRED Macro Feed Mirror", "C: BLS CPI / Rate Feed Mirror", ) MAX_URL_LEN = 200 _BLOCKED_SUFFIXES = (".local", ".localhost", ".internal", ".lan", ".home", ".corp", ".test", ".invalid") _HOST_CHARS = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-." # ========================================================================= # Pure logic. Everything below the storage class is deterministic and takes # no storage reference, so the same functions run in the leader, in the # validator and in the read-only preview views. # ========================================================================= def _ceil_div(a: int, b: int) -> int: return -((-a) // b) def _is_int(v) -> bool: # bool is an int subclass in Python: True would otherwise pass as 1. return isinstance(v, int) and not isinstance(v, bool) def _derive_stance(rate_change_bps: int, cpi_yoy_bps: int) -> int: """Deterministic stance. Priority: HAWKISH, then DOVISH, else NEUTRAL, so a stagflation print (cut + hot CPI) resolves HAWKISH.""" if rate_change_bps >= HIKE_BPS or cpi_yoy_bps > CPI_HAWKISH_ABOVE_BPS: return HAWKISH if rate_change_bps <= -CUT_BPS or cpi_yoy_bps < CPI_DOVISH_BELOW_BPS: return DOVISH return NEUTRAL def _release_hash(epoch_id: str, rate_change_bps: int, cpi_yoy_bps: int, stance: int, release_ts: int) -> str: # The release timestamp is part of the identity: a re-published release with # the same numbers but a later timestamp is a different (newer) release. canon = f"{epoch_id}|{rate_change_bps}|{cpi_yoy_bps}|{stance}|{release_ts}" return hashlib.sha256(canon.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest() def _parse_epoch_id(epoch_id: str) -> int: """`YYYY-Qn-TAG` -> monotonic sequence year*4 + (n-1), or -1 if malformed. The strict charset is also what makes the id safe to splice into a URL.""" if not isinstance(epoch_id, str) or len(epoch_id) > 24: return -1 parts = epoch_id.split("-") if len(parts) != 3: return -1 year, quarter, tag = parts if len(year) != 4 or not all("0" <= c <= "9" for c in year): return -1 if len(quarter) != 2 or quarter[0] != "Q" or quarter[1] not in "1234": return -1 if not 2 <= len(tag) <= 12: return -1 if not all(("A" <= c <= "Z") or ("0" <= c <= "9") for c in tag): return -1 y = int(year) if y < 2000 or y > 2200: return -1 return y * 4 + (int(quarter[1]) - 1) def _quarter_seq_of(ts: int) -> int: """Epoch-sequence value (year*4 + quarter-1) of the calendar quarter that contains `ts`; comparable with `_parse_epoch_id`.""" d = datetime.fromtimestamp(ts, timezone.utc) return d.year * 4 + (d.month - 1) // 3 def _is_hex64(s) -> bool: return isinstance(s, str) and len(s) == 64 and all(c in "0123456789abcdef" for c in s) def _classify_response(status, body, epoch_id: str) -> tuple: """(kind, stance, release_hash, release_ts) for one HTTP response. Only a clean 200 with a schema-valid document is a CONFIRMED / RETRACTED vote; a 404 is the release not being published (yet); EVERYTHING else -- 5xx, 429, redirects, transport faults, non-JSON, wrong schema, wrong epoch -- is an OUTAGE, which can never be mistaken for a vote and never forfeits a bond on its own.""" out = (SRC_OUTAGE, 0, "", 0) if not _is_int(status): return out if status == 404: return (SRC_NOT_FOUND, 0, "", 0) if status != 200: return out if isinstance(body, str): raw = body.encode("utf-8") elif isinstance(body, (bytes, bytearray)): raw = bytes(body) else: return out if len(raw) == 0 or len(raw) > MAX_FEED_BODY: return out try: doc = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8")) except Exception: return out if not isinstance(doc, dict): return out if doc.get("epoch_id") != epoch_id: return out st = doc.get("status") if st == "RETRACTED": return (SRC_RETRACTED, 0, "", 0) if st != "CONFIRMED": return out rate = doc.get("rate_change_bps") cpi = doc.get("cpi_yoy_bps") # Inline isinstance (not _is_int) so the type checker narrows `rate`/`cpi`. if not isinstance(rate, int) or isinstance(rate, bool): return out if not isinstance(cpi, int) or isinstance(cpi, bool): return out if rate < RATE_MIN_BPS or rate > RATE_MAX_BPS or cpi < CPI_MIN_BPS or cpi > CPI_MAX_BPS: return out rts = doc.get("release_ts") if not isinstance(rts, int) or isinstance(rts, bool): return out if rts < RELEASE_TS_MIN or rts > RELEASE_TS_MAX: return out stance = _derive_stance(rate, cpi) return (SRC_CONFIRMED, stance, _release_hash(epoch_id, rate, cpi, stance, rts), rts) def _fetch_source(url: str, epoch_id: str) -> tuple: try: res = gl.nondet.web.get(url) status = res.status body = res.body except Exception: return (SRC_OUTAGE, 0, "", 0) return _classify_response(status, body, epoch_id) def _resolve_quorum(states) -> dict: """Fold the three per-source states into the 5-field validator payload. Resolution order (see README verdict table): 1. any RETRACTED -> REJECTED 2. a (stance, hash) pair held by >= 2 sources -> VERIFIED, unless a third CONFIRMED source holds a different stance -> REJECTED 3. two CONFIRMED with different stances -> REJECTED 4. quorum unreachable even if every down source confirmed (best group + outages < 2)-> REJECTED 5. all three answered cleanly, no match -> REJECTED 6. otherwise a down source could still complete 2-of-3 -> QUORUM_FAILURE """ clean = 0 outages = 0 retracted = 0 groups: dict = {} stances: list = [] stamps: dict = {} for kind, stance, rhash, rts in states: if kind == SRC_OUTAGE: outages += 1 continue clean += 1 if kind == SRC_RETRACTED: retracted += 1 elif kind == SRC_CONFIRMED: groups[(stance, rhash)] = groups.get((stance, rhash), 0) + 1 stamps[(stance, rhash)] = rts # the hash binds the timestamp stances.append(stance) def out(verdict: int, stance: int, count: int, rhash: str, rts: int = 0) -> dict: return { "verdict": verdict, "stance": stance, "source_count": count, "release_hash": rhash, "release_ts": rts, } if retracted >= 1: return out(REJECTED_RELEASE, 0, clean, "") best_key = None best_n = 0 for key in sorted(groups.keys()): # sorted: deterministic tie-break if groups[key] > best_n: best_key = key best_n = groups[key] if best_key is not None and best_n >= 2: if any(s != best_key[0] for s in stances): return out(REJECTED_RELEASE, 0, clean, "") return out(VERIFIED_STANCE, best_key[0], best_n, best_key[1], stamps[best_key]) if len(set(stances)) > 1: return out(REJECTED_RELEASE, 0, clean, "") if best_n + outages < 2: return out(REJECTED_RELEASE, 0, clean, "") if outages == 0: return out(REJECTED_RELEASE, 0, clean, "") return out(QUORUM_FAILURE, 0, clean, "") PAYLOAD_KEYS = ("verdict", "stance", "source_count", "release_hash", "release_ts") # A challenge round carries one extra field, `contradicted`, describing what the # feeds prove about the STAGED release. Proposal rounds never carry it. CHALLENGE_KEY = "contradicted" PROOF_NONE = 0 # no proof either way (404 / lag / outage / fewer than 2 conflicts) PROOF_FAULT = 1 # adversarial fault: RETRACTED, or a conflict not newer than the stage PROOF_SUPERSEDED = 2 # an honest upstream revision: a strictly NEWER conflicting release def _contradicts(states, staged_hash: str, staged_ts: int) -> int: """What the feeds prove against the staged release. PROOF_FAULT (slash + revoke) is reserved for adversarial faults: * any source serves an explicit RETRACTED record, or * at least two sources serve a CONFIRMED release whose hash differs from the staged one and whose `release_ts` is NOT newer than the staged release's (a conflicting release that is not a later revision). PROOF_SUPERSEDED (cancel, refund the reporter in full, no slash) is an honest upstream revision: at least two sources serve conflicting CONFIRMED releases and fewer than two of them are non-newer, i.e. the conflict is (at least partly) a strictly newer `release_ts`. A reporter who staged the then-current release is never punished for that. 404s, 5xx, timeouts and every other lag/outage symptom are absence of evidence and count for nothing (PROOF_NONE).""" stale_or_equal = 0 newer = 0 for kind, _stance, rhash, rts in states: if kind == SRC_RETRACTED: return PROOF_FAULT if kind == SRC_CONFIRMED and rhash != staged_hash: if rts > staged_ts: newer += 1 else: stale_or_equal += 1 if stale_or_equal >= 2: return PROOF_FAULT if stale_or_equal + newer >= 2: return PROOF_SUPERSEDED return PROOF_NONE def _payload_ok(p) -> bool: """Exact 5-key schema + types + cross-field invariants. Used by the validator on the leader's result and by the contract before it trusts the consensus output (defence in depth against a forged payload).""" if not isinstance(p, dict): return False extra = len(p) - len(PAYLOAD_KEYS) if extra < 0 or extra > 1: return False if extra == 1: c = p.get(CHALLENGE_KEY) if not _is_int(c) or c not in (PROOF_NONE, PROOF_FAULT, PROOF_SUPERSEDED): return False for k in PAYLOAD_KEYS: if k not in p: return False v = p["verdict"] s = p["stance"] n = p["source_count"] h = p["release_hash"] t = p["release_ts"] if not (_is_int(v) and _is_int(s) and _is_int(n) and _is_int(t) and isinstance(h, str)): return False if v not in (0, 1, 2) or s not in (0, 1, 2) or n < 0 or n > SLOT_COUNT: return False if v == VERIFIED_STANCE: return n >= 2 and _is_hex64(h) and RELEASE_TS_MIN <= t <= RELEASE_TS_MAX return s == 0 and h == "" and t == 0 def _with_proof(states, against: str, staged_ts: int) -> dict: payload = _resolve_quorum(states) if against != "": payload[CHALLENGE_KEY] = _contradicts(states, against, staged_ts) return payload def _validator_agrees(leader_payload, mine) -> bool: """`run_validator` core: leader payload must be schema-valid and equal to the validator's own independent re-derivation on all five fields.""" if not _payload_ok(leader_payload) or not _payload_ok(mine): return False for k in PAYLOAD_KEYS: if leader_payload[k] != mine[k]: return False return leader_payload.get(CHALLENGE_KEY) == mine.get(CHALLENGE_KEY) def _host_of(url: str) -> str: try: return (urlsplit(url).hostname or "").lower() except Exception: return "" def _apex_of(host: str) -> str: # Registrable domain approximated by the last two labels. Conservative: # it may reject two genuinely distinct hosts under a public suffix such as # co.uk, but it can never accept two hosts that share infrastructure. labels = host.split(".") return ".".join(labels[-2:]) def _feed_prefix_error(url) -> str: """'' when `url` is an acceptable feed directory prefix, else the reason. A prefix is `https://host/path/`; the contract appends `.json`.""" if not isinstance(url, str) or len(url) == 0 or len(url) > MAX_URL_LEN: return "length" for c in url: o = ord(c) if o < 33 or o > 126: return "characters" if not url.startswith("https://"): return "scheme" if "%" in url or "\\" in url or "?" in url or "#" in url: return "forbidden character" try: parts = urlsplit(url) port = parts.port except Exception: return "unparseable" # `@` is legal in the path (jsDelivr's `repo@ref`) but never in the authority. if parts.scheme != "https" or port is not None or parts.username or parts.password or "@" in parts.netloc: return "authority" host = (parts.hostname or "").lower() if host == "" or ":" in parts.netloc or "[" in parts.netloc: return "host" if not all(c in _HOST_CHARS for c in host): return "host" labels = host.split(".") if len(labels) < 2 or any(len(lab) == 0 or lab[0] == "-" or lab[-1] == "-" for lab in labels): return "host" tld = labels[-1] if len(tld) < 2 or not all("a" <= c <= "z" for c in tld): # also rejects dotted-quad IPs return "host" if host == "localhost" or any(host.endswith(s) for s in _BLOCKED_SUFFIXES): return "host" path = parts.path if not path.startswith("/") or not path.endswith("/") or "//" in path: return "path" for seg in path.split("/"): if seg == "." or seg == "..": return "path" return "" def _key(addr) -> str: """Canonical storage key for an address: lowercase 0x-hex. `Address.as_hex` is checksummed (mixed case) while clients pass whatever case they hold, so every map key and every lookup goes through this one normaliser.""" return addr.as_hex.lower() def _risk_for(stance: int) -> tuple: return RISK_TABLE[stance] # ========================================================================= # Storage # ========================================================================= @allow_storage @dataclass class Epoch: status: str stance: u256 release_hash: str reporter: Address bond: u256 staged_at: u256 activates_at: u256 source_count: u256 attempts: u256 last_verdict: u256 resolved_by: str # challenger address hex on cancellation, else "" base_version: u256 # contract active_version when this release was staged revision: u256 # times a release of this epoch was revoked by a challenge release_ts: u256 # publication timestamp of the staged release @allow_storage @dataclass class Position: collateral: u256 scaled_debt: u256 class MacroStance(gl.contract.Contract): governor: Address # Feed registry (slot index 0..2) feed_url: TreeMap[u256, str] staged_feed_url: TreeMap[u256, str] staged_feed_at: TreeMap[u256, u256] # activation time, 0 == nothing staged # Epoch machine epochs: TreeMap[str, Epoch] epoch_index: TreeMap[u256, str] epoch_count: u256 pending_epoch: str last_executed_seq: u256 active_stance: u256 active_epoch_id: str active_since: u256 # Value accounting (wei). balance >= sum of the four buckets below. claimable: TreeMap[str, u256] total_claimable: u256 total_escrow: u256 # Forfeited reporter bonds (REJECTED_RELEASE). Permanently non-withdrawable: # there is NO method that debits it to an arbitrary address, and the # governor has no extraction path. The only outflow is KEEPER_REWARD to the # reporter of a release that was verified, staged and executed. locked_protocol_reserve: u256 total_collateral: u256 # Vault positions: TreeMap[str, Position] borrow_index: u256 index_updated_at: u256 total_scaled_debt: u256 reserves_accrued: u256 # Release lineage. `active_version` counts executed transitions; a staged # release records the value it was staged against and may only execute # against the same one. `revoked_hashes` holds "|" # for every release a challenge cancelled: a stale mirror serving it again # can never be staged or executed. active_version: u256 active_epoch_revision: u256 revoked_hashes: TreeMap[str, bool] # Release-timestamp high-water marks. `active_release_ts` is the timestamp # of the release that set the live stance: nothing at or below it may be # staged or executed again. `executed_epoch_releases` records it per epoch. active_release_ts: u256 executed_epoch_releases: TreeMap[str, u256] def __init__(self, feed_a: str, feed_b: str, feed_c: str): self.governor = gl.message.sender_address feeds = [feed_a, feed_b, feed_c] seen_hosts: list = [] seen_apex: list = [] for i in range(SLOT_COUNT): err = _feed_prefix_error(feeds[i]) if err != "": raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_FEED_URL} slot {i}: {err}") host = _host_of(feeds[i]) apex = _apex_of(host) if host in seen_hosts or apex in seen_apex: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_FEED_HOST} slot {i}") seen_hosts.append(host) seen_apex.append(apex) self.feed_url[(i)] = feeds[i] self.staged_feed_url[(i)] = "" self.staged_feed_at[(i)] = (0) self.epoch_count = (0) self.pending_epoch = "" self.last_executed_seq = (0) self.active_stance = (NEUTRAL) self.active_epoch_id = "" self.active_since = (self._now()) self.total_claimable = (0) self.total_escrow = (0) self.locked_protocol_reserve = (0) self.total_collateral = (0) self.borrow_index = (RAY) self.index_updated_at = (self._now()) self.total_scaled_debt = (0) self.reserves_accrued = (0) self.active_version = (0) self.active_epoch_revision = (0) self.active_release_ts = (0) # ------------------------------------------------------------------ views @gl.public.view def get_protocol_overview(self) -> dict: t = _risk_for(int(self.active_stance)) return { "governor": self.governor.as_hex, "now": self._now(), "active_stance": int(self.active_stance), "active_stance_name": STANCE_NAMES[int(self.active_stance)], "active_epoch_id": self.active_epoch_id, "active_since": int(self.active_since), "max_ltv_bps": t[0], "borrow_rate_bps": t[1], "reserve_factor_bps": t[2], "pending_epoch": self.pending_epoch, "last_executed_seq": int(self.last_executed_seq), "active_version": int(self.active_version), "active_epoch_revision": int(self.active_epoch_revision), "proposal_validity_window": PROPOSAL_VALIDITY_WINDOW, "max_epoch_seq": _quarter_seq_of(self._now()), "current_year": _quarter_seq_of(self._now()) // 4, "current_quarter": _quarter_seq_of(self._now()) % 4 + 1, "active_release_ts": int(self.active_release_ts), "epoch_count": int(self.epoch_count), "locked_protocol_reserve": str(self.locked_protocol_reserve), "total_escrow": str(self.total_escrow), "total_claimable": str(self.total_claimable), "total_collateral": str(self.total_collateral), "total_scaled_debt": str(self.total_scaled_debt), "borrow_index": str(self.borrow_index), "reserves_accrued": str(self.reserves_accrued), "reporter_bond": str(REPORTER_BOND), "challenger_bond": str(CHALLENGER_BOND), "activation_timelock": ACTIVATION_TIMELOCK, "feed_rotation_timelock": FEED_ROTATION_TIMELOCK, } @gl.public.view def get_active_params(self) -> dict: s = int(self.active_stance) t = _risk_for(s) return { "stance": s, "stance_name": STANCE_NAMES[s], "max_ltv_bps": t[0], "borrow_rate_bps": t[1], "reserve_factor_bps": t[2], "epoch_id": self.active_epoch_id, "active_since": int(self.active_since), } @gl.public.view def get_risk_table(self, stance: int) -> dict: if stance < 0 or stance > 2: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_STANCE} {stance}") t = _risk_for(stance) return { "stance": stance, "stance_name": STANCE_NAMES[stance], "max_ltv_bps": t[0], "borrow_rate_bps": t[1], "reserve_factor_bps": t[2], } @gl.public.view def get_feed_registry(self) -> list: out = [] for i in range(SLOT_COUNT): active = self.feed_url[(i)] staged = self.staged_feed_url[(i)] out.append( { "slot": i, "label": SLOT_LABELS[i], "active_url": active, "active_host": _host_of(active), "staged_url": staged, "staged_host": _host_of(staged) if staged != "" else "", "activates_at": int(self.staged_feed_at[(i)]), } ) return out @gl.public.view def get_epoch(self, epoch_id: str) -> dict: if epoch_id not in self.epochs: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_EPOCH_STATE} unknown epoch") return self._epoch_view(epoch_id) @gl.public.view def has_epoch(self, epoch_id: str) -> bool: return epoch_id in self.epochs @gl.public.view def get_epoch_count(self) -> int: return int(self.epoch_count) @gl.public.view def get_epoch_by_index(self, index: u256) -> dict: if index >= self.epoch_count: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_EPOCH_STATE} index out of range") return self._epoch_view(self.epoch_index[index]) @gl.public.view def claimable_of(self, owner_hex: str) -> str: key = owner_hex.lower() if key not in self.claimable: return "0" return str(self.claimable[key]) @gl.public.view def whoami(self) -> str: return gl.message.sender_address.as_hex @gl.public.view def get_solvency(self) -> dict: owed = ( int(self.total_claimable) + int(self.total_escrow) + int(self.locked_protocol_reserve) + int(self.total_collateral) ) return {"owed": str(owed), "balance": str(self.balance), "solvent": int(self.balance) >= owed} @gl.public.view def get_account_health(self, owner_hex: str) -> dict: key = owner_hex.lower() collateral = 0 scaled = 0 if key in self.positions: p = self.positions[key] collateral = int(p.collateral) scaled = int(p.scaled_debt) s = int(self.active_stance) max_ltv = _risk_for(s)[0] rate = _risk_for(s)[1] idx = self._projected_index(rate) debt = _ceil_div(scaled * idx, RAY) capacity = collateral * max_ltv // BPS over = debt * BPS > collateral * max_ltv if debt == 0: status = "NO_DEBT" ltv = 0 health = 0 else: status = "OVER_LTV" if over else "HEALTHY" ltv = debt * BPS // collateral if collateral > 0 else 1000000000 health = (collateral * max_ltv // debt) if collateral > 0 else 0 return { "owner": key, "collateral": str(collateral), "debt": str(debt), "stance": s, "stance_name": STANCE_NAMES[s], "max_ltv_bps": max_ltv, "borrow_rate_bps": rate, "reserve_factor_bps": _risk_for(s)[2], "ltv_bps": ltv, "borrow_capacity": str(capacity), "available_to_borrow": str(self._max_borrow(collateral, scaled, idx, max_ltv)), "health_factor_bps": health, "status": status, } # Pure helpers exposed so clients and tests share one definition of the rules. @gl.public.view def derive_stance(self, rate_change_bps: int, cpi_yoy_bps: int) -> int: return _derive_stance(rate_change_bps, cpi_yoy_bps) @gl.public.view def parse_epoch_id(self, epoch_id: str) -> int: return _parse_epoch_id(epoch_id) @gl.public.view def feed_prefix_error(self, url: str) -> str: return _feed_prefix_error(url) @gl.public.view def resolve_verdict(self, states_json: str) -> dict: """Fold three per-source states `[[kind, stance, hash, ts], x3]` exactly as the quorum round does. Pure; used to publish the verdict table.""" try: raw = json.loads(states_json) except Exception: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_PAYLOAD} not JSON") if not isinstance(raw, list) or len(raw) != SLOT_COUNT: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_PAYLOAD} need exactly {SLOT_COUNT} states") states = [] for item in raw: if ( not isinstance(item, list) or len(item) != 4 or item[0] not in SOURCE_KINDS or not _is_int(item[1]) or item[1] not in (0, 1, 2) or not isinstance(item[2], str) or not _is_int(item[3]) or item[3] < 0 ): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_PAYLOAD} bad state") states.append((item[0], item[1], item[2], item[3])) return _resolve_quorum(states) @gl.public.view def classify_feed_response(self, status: int, body: str, epoch_id: str) -> dict: kind, stance, rhash, rts = _classify_response(status, body, epoch_id) return {"kind": kind, "stance": stance, "release_hash": rhash, "release_ts": rts} # --------------------------------------------------- epoch: propose / sync @gl.public.write.payable def propose_epoch_sync(self, epoch_id: str) -> dict: seq = _parse_epoch_id(epoch_id) if seq < 0: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_EPOCH_ID}") now = self._now() # An epoch cannot name a quarter that has not begun. A future id would # otherwise stage, and the monotonic-quarter rule would then lock out # every earlier quarter until it executed. if seq > _quarter_seq_of(now): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_FUTURE_EPOCH}") bond = int(gl.message.value) if bond < REPORTER_BOND: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_BOND} reporter bond below minimum") if bond > MAX_BOND: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_BOND} reporter bond above maximum") if self.pending_epoch != "": pending = self.epochs[self.pending_epoch] if now > int(pending.activates_at) + PROPOSAL_VALIDITY_WINDOW: # A stuck, never-executed stage must not block the protocol # forever: expire it (releasing its bond) and carry on. self._expire_staged(self.pending_epoch, pending) else: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_PENDING}") if seq < int(self.last_executed_seq): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_STALE}") attempts = 0 revision = 0 if epoch_id in self.epochs: prev = self.epochs[epoch_id] # An EXECUTED epoch may be re-proposed only as a strictly newer # revision (release_ts is checked after consensus, below). if prev.status not in RETRYABLE and prev.status != EP_EXECUTED: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_EPOCH_STATE} {prev.status}") attempts = int(prev.attempts) revision = int(prev.revision) res = self._run_quorum(epoch_id) verdict = int(res["verdict"]) if verdict == VERIFIED_STANCE and self._is_revoked(epoch_id, str(res["release_hash"])): # The mirrors are serving a release that a challenge already # cancelled (stale cache, or a replayed retraction). Revert so the # honest reporter keeps the bond; the revoked release never stages. raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_STALE_RELEASE}") release_ts = int(res["release_ts"]) if verdict == VERIFIED_STANCE: if release_ts > now + RELEASE_FUTURE_SLACK: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_FUTURE_RELEASE}") # Never stage a release that is not strictly newer than what is # live, nor one not newer than the last release executed for this # same epoch. This is the rollback guard: a stale mirror serving an # older (but never revoked) release for the same quarter reverts. if release_ts <= int(self.active_release_ts): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_STALE_REVISION}") if epoch_id in self.executed_epoch_releases and release_ts <= int( self.executed_epoch_releases[epoch_id] ): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_STALE_REVISION}") sender = gl.message.sender_address status = EP_QUORUM_FAILED activates_at = 0 staged_at = 0 if verdict == VERIFIED_STANCE: status = EP_STAGED staged_at = now activates_at = now + ACTIVATION_TIMELOCK self.total_escrow += bond self.pending_epoch = epoch_id elif verdict == QUORUM_FAILURE: # An outage is not the reporter's fault: the bond comes straight back. self._credit(_key(sender), bond) else: status = EP_REJECTED self.locked_protocol_reserve += bond self._store_epoch( epoch_id, Epoch( status=status, stance=(int(res["stance"])), release_hash=str(res["release_hash"]), reporter=sender, bond=(bond if verdict == VERIFIED_STANCE else 0), staged_at=(staged_at), activates_at=(activates_at), source_count=(int(res["source_count"])), attempts=(attempts + 1), last_verdict=(verdict), resolved_by="", base_version=(int(self.active_version)), revision=(revision), release_ts=(release_ts), ), ) return self._epoch_view(epoch_id) @gl.public.write.payable def challenge_staged_epoch(self, epoch_id: str) -> dict: bond = int(gl.message.value) if bond < CHALLENGER_BOND: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_BOND} challenger bond below minimum") if bond > MAX_BOND: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_BOND} challenger bond above maximum") if epoch_id not in self.epochs: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_EPOCH_STATE} unknown epoch") ep = self.epochs[epoch_id] if ep.status != EP_STAGED: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_EPOCH_STATE} {ep.status}") now = self._now() # A staged release stays challengeable until it is executed or expires, # not just for the first 24h: a retraction on day 2 or day 5 must still # be able to abort the transition. if now > int(ep.activates_at) + PROPOSAL_VALIDITY_WINDOW: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_WINDOW}") res = self._run_quorum(epoch_id, ep.release_hash, int(ep.release_ts)) verdict = int(res["verdict"]) proof = int(res[CHALLENGE_KEY]) contradicted = proof == PROOF_FAULT superseded = proof == PROOF_SUPERSEDED challenger = _key(gl.message.sender_address) reporter_hex = _key(ep.reporter) reporter_bond = int(ep.bond) same = ( verdict == VERIFIED_STANCE and int(res["stance"]) == int(ep.stance) and str(res["release_hash"]) == ep.release_hash ) outcome = "UPHELD" if contradicted: # POSITIVE proof of an adversarial fault (an explicit RETRACTED # record, or two sources serving a conflicting CONFIRMED release # that is not newer than the stage): cancel, slash the reporter to # the challenger, revoke the release. self.total_escrow -= reporter_bond self._credit(challenger, bond + reporter_bond) ep.status = EP_CANCELLED ep.bond = (0) ep.resolved_by = challenger ep.last_verdict = (verdict) # The cancelled release is revoked for good and the epoch's # revision advances: re-serving it can never be staged again. self.revoked_hashes[self._revoke_key(epoch_id, ep.release_hash)] = True ep.revision = (int(ep.revision) + 1) self.epochs[epoch_id] = ep self.pending_epoch = "" outcome = "CANCELLED" elif superseded: # An honest upstream revision (a strictly newer release_ts): the # staged release is stale through no fault of the reporter. Cancel # it, return 100% of the reporter's bond, and pay the challenger # no bounty (their own bond comes back). The hash is NOT revoked # and the revision does not advance: this is not an adversarial # fault, and the newer release is free to be proposed. self.total_escrow -= reporter_bond self._credit(reporter_hex, reporter_bond) self._credit(challenger, bond) ep.status = EP_CANCELLED ep.bond = (0) ep.resolved_by = challenger ep.last_verdict = (verdict) self.epochs[epoch_id] = ep self.pending_epoch = "" outcome = "SUPERSEDED" elif same: # Feeds still confirm the staged release: frivolous challenge, # its bond compensates the reporter. self._credit(reporter_hex, bond) elif verdict == QUORUM_FAILURE: # Inconclusive (an outage): the challenger is not punished, the # staged epoch is left to run its timelock. self._credit(challenger, bond) outcome = "INCONCLUSIVE" else: # No proof either way (404 / propagation lag / unreachable # quorum): absence of evidence is not invalidity. The release is # UPHELD -- not cancelled, not revoked, the reporter's bond is # untouched -- and the challenger, who was not shown wrong, is # refunded rather than punished. self._credit(challenger, bond) view = self._epoch_view(epoch_id) view["challenge_outcome"] = outcome view["challenge_verdict"] = verdict view["challenge_contradicted"] = contradicted view["challenge_superseded"] = superseded return view @gl.public.write def execute_stance_transition(self, epoch_id: str) -> dict: if epoch_id not in self.epochs: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_EPOCH_STATE} unknown epoch") ep = self.epochs[epoch_id] if ep.status != EP_STAGED: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_EPOCH_STATE} {ep.status}") now = self._now() if now < int(ep.activates_at): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_TIMELOCK}") if now > int(ep.activates_at) + PROPOSAL_VALIDITY_WINDOW: # Too old to apply blindly. This must COMMIT (so it cannot revert): # the bond is released, the stage is cleared, parameters untouched. refund = int(ep.bond) self._expire_staged(epoch_id, ep) return { "epoch_id": epoch_id, "status": EP_EXPIRED, "stance": int(self.active_stance), "stance_name": STANCE_NAMES[int(self.active_stance)], "reporter_refund": str(refund), "keeper_reward": "0", } seq = _parse_epoch_id(epoch_id) if seq < int(self.last_executed_seq): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_STALE}") # Release lineage: the stage must still be against the live version and # must not be a release a challenge has since revoked. if int(ep.base_version) != int(self.active_version): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_STALE_RELEASE}") if self._is_revoked(epoch_id, ep.release_hash): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_STALE_RELEASE}") if int(ep.release_ts) <= int(self.active_release_ts): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_STALE_REVISION}") if epoch_id in self.executed_epoch_releases and int(ep.release_ts) <= int( self.executed_epoch_releases[epoch_id] ): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_STALE_REVISION}") # Interest through `now` accrues at the OLD stance's rate. self._accrue_global() stance = int(ep.stance) self.active_stance = (stance) self.active_epoch_id = epoch_id self.active_since = (self._now()) self.last_executed_seq = (seq) self.active_version = (int(self.active_version) + 1) self.active_release_ts = (int(ep.release_ts)) self.executed_epoch_releases[epoch_id] = (int(ep.release_ts)) self.active_epoch_revision = (int(ep.revision)) self.pending_epoch = "" bond = int(ep.bond) reward = KEEPER_REWARD if int(self.locked_protocol_reserve) >= KEEPER_REWARD else int(self.locked_protocol_reserve) self.locked_protocol_reserve -= reward self.total_escrow -= bond self._credit(_key(ep.reporter), bond + reward) ep.status = EP_EXECUTED ep.bond = (0) self.epochs[epoch_id] = ep t = _risk_for(stance) return { "epoch_id": epoch_id, "status": EP_EXECUTED, "stance": stance, "stance_name": STANCE_NAMES[stance], "max_ltv_bps": t[0], "borrow_rate_bps": t[1], "reserve_factor_bps": t[2], "reporter_refund": str(bond), "keeper_reward": str(reward), } @gl.public.write def claim_payout(self) -> str: key = _key(gl.message.sender_address) if key not in self.claimable or self.claimable[key] == 0: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_NO_BALANCE}") amount = int(self.claimable[key]) self.claimable[key] = (0) self.total_claimable -= amount self._pay(gl.message.sender_address, amount, restore_claimable=key) return str(amount) # --------------------------------------------------- governance: feeds @gl.public.write def stage_feed_rotation(self, slot: u256, url_prefix: str) -> dict: self._only_governor() s = self._slot(slot) err = _feed_prefix_error(url_prefix) if err != "": raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_FEED_URL} {err}") host = _host_of(url_prefix) apex = _apex_of(host) for j in range(SLOT_COUNT): if j == s: continue # a slot may be re-pointed within its own host for u in (self.feed_url[(j)], self.staged_feed_url[(j)]): if u == "": continue h = _host_of(u) if h == host or _apex_of(h) == apex: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_FEED_HOST} slot {j}") activates_at = self._now() + FEED_ROTATION_TIMELOCK self.staged_feed_url[(s)] = url_prefix self.staged_feed_at[(s)] = (activates_at) return {"slot": s, "staged_url": url_prefix, "activates_at": activates_at} @gl.public.write def activate_feed_rotation(self, slot: u256) -> dict: s = self._slot(slot) staged = self.staged_feed_url[(s)] if staged == "": raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_NO_STAGED}") if self._now() < int(self.staged_feed_at[(s)]): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_TIMELOCK}") host = _host_of(staged) apex = _apex_of(host) for j in range(SLOT_COUNT): if j == s: continue h = _host_of(self.feed_url[(j)]) if h == host or _apex_of(h) == apex: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_FEED_HOST} slot {j}") self.feed_url[(s)] = staged self.staged_feed_url[(s)] = "" self.staged_feed_at[(s)] = (0) return {"slot": s, "active_url": staged} @gl.public.write def cancel_feed_rotation(self, slot: u256) -> None: self._only_governor() s = self._slot(slot) if self.staged_feed_url[(s)] == "": raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_NO_STAGED}") self.staged_feed_url[(s)] = "" self.staged_feed_at[(s)] = (0) @gl.public.write def transfer_governor(self, new_governor_hex: str) -> None: self._only_governor() new_gov = Address(new_governor_hex) if new_gov == self.governor: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_UNAUTHORIZED} already governor") self.governor = new_gov # ----------------------------------------------------------- vault @gl.public.write.payable def deposit_collateral(self) -> dict: amt = int(gl.message.value) if amt <= 0: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_AMOUNT} deposit must be positive") self._accrue_global() key = _key(gl.message.sender_address) collateral, scaled = self._position(key) collateral += amt self.positions[key] = Position(collateral=(collateral), scaled_debt=(scaled)) self.total_collateral += amt return {"collateral": str(collateral)} @gl.public.write def borrow_against_collateral(self, amount: u256) -> dict: amt = int(amount) if amt <= 0: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_AMOUNT} borrow must be positive") self._accrue_global() key = _key(gl.message.sender_address) collateral, scaled = self._position(key) if collateral == 0: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_COLLATERAL}") idx = int(self.borrow_index) add = _ceil_div(amt * RAY, idx) # round UP: recorded debt >= amount new_scaled = scaled + add new_debt = _ceil_div(new_scaled * idx, RAY) max_ltv = _risk_for(int(self.active_stance))[0] if new_debt * BPS > collateral * max_ltv: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_LTV}") self.positions[key] = Position(collateral=(collateral), scaled_debt=(new_scaled)) self.total_scaled_debt += add return {"borrowed": str(amt), "debt": str(new_debt), "max_ltv_bps": max_ltv} @gl.public.write def repay(self, amount: u256) -> dict: amt = int(amount) if amt <= 0: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_AMOUNT} repay must be positive") self._accrue_global() key = _key(gl.message.sender_address) collateral, scaled = self._position(key) idx = int(self.borrow_index) debt = _ceil_div(scaled * idx, RAY) if debt == 0: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_NO_DEBT}") if amt >= debt: sub = scaled # full repay zeroes the position exactly: no dust else: sub = amt * RAY // idx # round DOWN: never repays more than paid if sub == 0: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_AMOUNT} repay below one scaled unit") new_scaled = scaled - sub new_debt = _ceil_div(new_scaled * idx, RAY) self.positions[key] = Position(collateral=(collateral), scaled_debt=(new_scaled)) self.total_scaled_debt -= sub return {"repaid": str(debt - new_debt), "debt": str(new_debt)} @gl.public.write def withdraw_collateral(self, amount: u256) -> dict: amt = int(amount) if amt <= 0: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_AMOUNT} withdrawal must be positive") self._accrue_global() key = _key(gl.message.sender_address) collateral, scaled = self._position(key) if amt > collateral: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_COLLATERAL}") remaining = collateral - amt debt = _ceil_div(scaled * int(self.borrow_index), RAY) max_ltv = _risk_for(int(self.active_stance))[0] if debt * BPS > remaining * max_ltv: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_LTV}") self.positions[key] = Position(collateral=(remaining), scaled_debt=(scaled)) self.total_collateral -= amt try: gl.chain.Account(gl.message.sender_address).emit_transfer(amt, on="finalized") except Exception: self.positions[key] = Position(collateral=(collateral), scaled_debt=(scaled)) self.total_collateral += amt raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_TRANSFER}") return {"withdrawn": str(amt), "collateral": str(remaining)} # ------------------------------------------------------------ internals def _only_governor(self) -> None: if gl.message.sender_address != self.governor: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_UNAUTHORIZED} governor only") def _slot(self, slot) -> int: s = int(slot) if s < 0 or s >= SLOT_COUNT: raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_SLOT}") return s def _now(self) -> int: # Inside GenVM datetime.now() is the transaction timestamp; the direct # harness patches it identically so warp() controls the clock. return int(datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp()) def _credit(self, owner_hex: str, amount: int) -> None: if amount <= 0: return cur = int(self.claimable[owner_hex]) if owner_hex in self.claimable else 0 self.claimable[owner_hex] = (cur + amount) self.total_claimable += amount def _pay(self, dest: Address, amount: int, restore_claimable: str = "") -> None: # Debit-before-transfer; an enqueue-time failure restores the debit. try: gl.chain.Account(dest).emit_transfer(amount, on="finalized") except Exception: if restore_claimable != "": self.claimable[restore_claimable] = (amount) self.total_claimable += amount raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_TRANSFER}") def _position(self, key: str) -> tuple: if key in self.positions: p = self.positions[key] return (int(p.collateral), int(p.scaled_debt)) return (0, 0) def _revoke_key(self, epoch_id: str, release_hash: str) -> str: return f"{epoch_id}|{release_hash}" def _is_revoked(self, epoch_id: str, release_hash: str) -> bool: return self._revoke_key(epoch_id, release_hash) in self.revoked_hashes def _expire_staged(self, epoch_id: str, ep: Epoch) -> None: bond = int(ep.bond) self.total_escrow -= bond self._credit(_key(ep.reporter), bond) ep.status = EP_EXPIRED ep.bond = (0) self.epochs[epoch_id] = ep self.pending_epoch = "" def _store_epoch(self, epoch_id: str, ep: Epoch) -> None: if epoch_id not in self.epochs: self.epoch_index[self.epoch_count] = epoch_id self.epoch_count += 1 self.epochs[epoch_id] = ep def _epoch_view(self, epoch_id: str) -> dict: e = self.epochs[epoch_id] verdict = int(e.last_verdict) stance = int(e.stance) return { "epoch_id": epoch_id, "status": e.status, "verdict": verdict, "verdict_name": VERDICT_NAMES[verdict], "stance": stance, "stance_name": STANCE_NAMES[stance], "source_count": int(e.source_count), "release_hash": e.release_hash, "reporter": e.reporter.as_hex, "bond": str(e.bond), "staged_at": int(e.staged_at), "activates_at": int(e.activates_at), "attempts": int(e.attempts), "resolved_by": e.resolved_by, "release_ts": int(e.release_ts), "base_version": int(e.base_version), "revision": int(e.revision), "expires_at": (int(e.activates_at) + PROPOSAL_VALIDITY_WINDOW) if int(e.activates_at) > 0 else 0, "seq": _parse_epoch_id(epoch_id), } def _projected_index(self, rate_bps: int) -> int: dt = self._now() - int(self.index_updated_at) idx = int(self.borrow_index) if dt <= 0: return idx return idx + _ceil_div(idx * rate_bps * dt, BPS * SECONDS_PER_YEAR) def _accrue_global(self) -> None: now = self._now() last = int(self.index_updated_at) if now <= last: return t = _risk_for(int(self.active_stance)) idx = int(self.borrow_index) # Index growth rounds UP so no sequence of tiny accruals can undercharge. delta = _ceil_div(idx * t[1] * (now - last), BPS * SECONDS_PER_YEAR) interest = _ceil_div(int(self.total_scaled_debt) * delta, RAY) self.reserves_accrued += interest * t[2] // BPS self.borrow_index = (idx + delta) self.index_updated_at = (now) def _max_borrow(self, collateral: int, scaled: int, idx: int, max_ltv: int) -> int: """Exact largest `amount` that `borrow_against_collateral` accepts. The borrow check is `ceil((scaled + ceil(a*RAY/idx)) * idx / RAY) <= D` with `D = floor(collateral * ltv / BPS)`. Both ceilings invert in closed form, so there is no search and no bound on how far `idx` has drifted: ceil(y / RAY) <= D <=> y <= D * RAY x := ceil(a*RAY/idx) <= floor(D*RAY/idx) - scaled ceil(a*RAY/idx) <= X <=> a <= floor(X * idx / RAY) (An earlier version walked down from `capacity - debt` four steps; the post-borrow overshoot is up to `idx/RAY + 1` wei, so once the index had grown past ~3.0 it reported 0 for a position that could still borrow.) """ d_max = collateral * max_ltv // BPS x_max = (d_max * RAY) // idx - scaled if x_max <= 0: return 0 return (x_max * idx) // RAY def _run_quorum(self, epoch_id: str, against: str = "", staged_ts: int = 0) -> dict: """One 2-of-3 round. With `against` (a staged release hash) the payload also carries `contradicted` (see `_contradicts`): what the feeds prove against the staged release, given its hash and `release_ts`.""" urls: list = [] for i in range(SLOT_COUNT): urls.append(str(self.feed_url[(i)]) + epoch_id + ".json") def leader_fn() -> dict: states = [] for u in urls: states.append(_fetch_source(u, epoch_id)) return _with_proof(states, against, staged_ts) def validator_fn(leaders_res: gl.vm.Result) -> bool: if not isinstance(leaders_res, gl.vm.Return): return False states = [] for u in urls: states.append(_fetch_source(u, epoch_id)) return _validator_agrees(leaders_res.calldata, _with_proof(states, against, staged_ts)) res = gl.vm.run_nondet(leader_fn, validator_fn) if not _payload_ok(res): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_PAYLOAD}") if (CHALLENGE_KEY in res) != (against != ""): raise gl.vm.UserError(f"{ERR_PAYLOAD}") out = { "verdict": int(res["verdict"]), "stance": int(res["stance"]), "source_count": int(res["source_count"]), "release_hash": str(res["release_hash"]), "release_ts": int(res["release_ts"]), } if against != "": out[CHALLENGE_KEY] = int(res[CHALLENGE_KEY]) return out